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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The lit: al 1 Court o f Appea 1 s 1 las j i iri sdi ct i on ove i t: 1 le ins t: ant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) . 
S TATEMENT OF ISSUES , STANDARDS UE REVIEW 
1. Whether a trial court, by failing to allow an accused 
to be present during a communication betweei i the j udge ai id j i ii: y, 
denied the accused of the constitutional right to be present at 
all stages of the trial. Because this issue was not raised at 
trial, due to the trial court's failure to enter the question and 
answer into the record, it presents circumstances constituting 
plain erroi. See State v. Dunn, 850 p.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
A. Whether Mr. Belt voluntarily,, intentionall y, and 
knowingly waived his const: tut:i oi la 1 i ight: to 1: = present 
at all stages of the trial. As stated above, this 
issue presents circumstances constituting plain error. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct 
App. 1991). 
B. Whether a trial court, by failing to allow an 
accused to be present duri i Ig a ::ornmi Ii 3 :i cat:i on between 
6 
the judge and jury, violates the mandatory language of 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a), which requires
 { 
that in all cases the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. Inasmuch 
as this issue was not raised at trial, due to the trial 
court's failure to enter the question and answer into 
the record, it presents circumstances constituting 
plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . I 
2. Whether an accused is denied his constitutional right 
to due process by a trial court's failure to enter the question 
i 
and answer into the record. Due to the circumstances surrounding 
the issue not being raised at trial, the issue is reviewed for 
plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
3. Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to object { 
to Mr. Belt's absence during the in-chambers hearing concerning 
the jury's note and the proposed communication between the judge 
i 
and the jury concerning the note deprived Mr. Belt of his 
constitutional right to be present in person at all stages of the 
trial as well as his rights to due process and the effective
 { 
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assistance of counsel. To make such a showing, Mr. Belt must 
show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance, 
falling below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). Such 
claims present mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). When 
available, the appellate court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal principles 
to its factual findings for correctness. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 
1, 4-5 (Utah 1993) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving the constitutional right of an 
accused to be present at all stages of the trial. On December 
19, 1997, Lynn L. Belt was being held in the Davis County Jail on 
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
8 
drug paraphernalia. The charges for which Mr. Belt was being 
held were ultimately dismissed due to a lack of evidence.
 { 
On the morning of December 19, 1997, Mr. Belt and his 
cellmate, Mr. Darwin E. Thompson, were both engaged in an 
argument. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thompson hit Mr. Belt first, 
after which Mr. Belt hit Mr. Thompson. 
Mr. Belt was subsequently charged with Assault by a 
Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.5. At trial, Mr. Thompson, who appeared as a witness 
on behalf of the State, essentially testified that he could not < 
remember any events surrounding the argument and fight between he 
and Mr. Belt. 
I 
After the jury retired for its deliberations, it apparently 
sent a note to the judge with the following inquiry: "What was 
Mr. Belt in Jail fore [sic]?" Notifying neither counsel nor Mr. 
Belt, the judge returned the note to the jury with the following 
response or supplemental instruction: "The reason Mr. Belt was 
in jail is irrelevant. Please proceed with your deliberations < 
based on the testimony presented in the courtroom." The note is 
signed, "Darwin C. Hansen, District Court Judge". The jury 
i 
thereafter returned a verdict of guilty as charged. That same 
day, the court sentenced Mr. Belt to an indeterminate term of 
( 
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i 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, after which this 
appeal followed. 
After the filing of Mr. Belt's Brief of Appellant, the State 
filed a motion to supplement the record and to stay the briefing 
deadlines. On July 9, 1999, this Court granted the State's 
motion and temporarily remanded the case to the trial court "for 
the purpose of entering findings of fact concerning the nature 
and content of the judge's discussions with counsel and the jury 
concerning the jury's note." 
On August 27, 1999, the parties appeared before the trial 
court for hearing on the motion to supplement the record. 
Thereafter, the trial court's Findings of Fact concerning the 
communications with counsel and the jury were entered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 19, 1997, Lynn L. Belt, the Defendant in 
the instant case, was being held in the Davis County Jail on 
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
drug paraphernalia (See R. 167, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
Held on May 6, 1998, p. 3, lines 11-15; R. 169, Transcript of 
Trial Held on July 17, 1998, Vol. II., p. 259, lines 3-5).x 
*Mr. Belt was arrested on December 16, 1997, in the course 
of an investigation of a car accident that occurred at 
approximately 6:30 that morning (See R. 167, Transcript of 
Preliminary Hearing Held on May 6, 1998, p. 4, lines 15-20). 
10 
2. The charges for which Mr. Belt was being held were 
ultimately dismissed due to a lack of evidence (See R. 169,
 { 
Transcript of Trial Held on July 17, 1998, Vol. II., p. 255, 
lines 18-25, and p. 259, lines 6-11). 
3. On the morning of December 19, 1997, Mr. Belt and his 
cellmate, Mr. Darwin E. Thompson, were both engaged in an 
argument (See id. at R. 169, p. 159, lines 16-20, p. 161-62); 
4. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thompson hit Mr. Belt first, 
after which Mr. Belt hit Mr. Thompson (See id. at R. 169, p. 162-
63) . ( 
5. Mr. Belt was charged with Assault by a Prisoner, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 
i 
(See R. 3, Amended Information). 
6. At trial, Mr. Thompson, who appeared as a witness on 
behalf of the State, essentially testified that he could not 
remember any events surrounding the argument and fight between he 
and Mr. Belt (See R. 168, Transcript of Trial Held July 16, 1998, 
Vol. I., p. 82, lines 11-20, p. 83, lines 8-11, pp. 84-85). { 
7. After the jury retired for its deliberations, it 
apparently sent a note to the judge with the following inquiry: 
i 
"What was Mr. Belt in Jail fore [sic]?" (See R. 92, Note to Judge 
from Jury). 
i 
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8. The judge convened an informal hearing in chambers with 
the prosecutor, in person, and via cellular telephone with Mr. 
Belt's counsel2 (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, 1f4) . 
9. Mr. Belt was not present during the informal hearing in 
chambers even though he was in a holding cell at the time (See 
id. at f5) .3 
10. The judge dictated a proposed response to the jury's 
note, which stated, "The reason Mr. Belt was in jail is 
irrelevant. Please proceed with your deliberations based on the 
testimony presented in the courtroom." (See id. at \S) . At the 
bottom of the note the judge signed the response, "Darwin C. 
Hansen, District Court Judge" (See id.). 
11. Both the prosecutor and counsel for Mr. Belt, who was 
not present, agreed that the language and response were 
appropriate (See id. at flO). No supplemental jury instructions 
were given (See id. at 1fll) . 
2During the informal hearing in chambers, the trial court 
utilized the speaker phone (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, f7). 
At the temporary remand hearing, Mr. Belt's counsel recalled 
speaking with the judge by way of telephone but she did not 
recall knowing that the prosecutor was present with the judge 
during the conversation (See id. at f9). 
3The informal hearing held by the judge to discuss the 
jury's note was not recorded even though it could have been 
recorded by magnetic tape (See R. 197-99, Findings of Fact, f6). 
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12. The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty as 
charged (See R. 169, Transcript of Trial Held on July 17, 1998, 
Vol. II., p. 247, lines 11-22; R. 93, Verdict); 
13. That same day, the court sentenced Mr. Belt to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison 
(See id. at R. 169, p. 263, lines 15-19; R. 107, Judgment and 
Commitment to the Utah State Prison); 
14. Pursuant to an Order granting an extension of time to 
file Notice of Appeal, Mr. Belt filed Notice of Appeal on October 
19, 1998 (See R. 141-43, Order Granting Motion for Extension of 
Time to File Notice of Appeal; R. 144-48, Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court in the instant case, by failing to 
allow Mr. Belt to be present in person during the discussion of 
the proposed communication between the judge and jury, denied 
him, as the accused, of the constitutional right to be present at 
all stages of the trial. In the course of precluding Mr. Belt 
from being present during the in-chambers hearing concerning the 
proposed communication between the judge and jury, the trial 
court did not inform Mr. Belt of the substance of the 
communication and thereby failed to afford him the opportunity to 
be heard before the supplemental charge or response was given to 
13 
the jury. Because this issue was not raised at trial, which 
failure was due to the trial court's failure to enter the 
question and answer into the record, this issue, as well as the 
those that follow, present circumstances constituting plain 
error. 
A. In light of the circumstances surrounding the 
instant case, Mr. Belt did not voluntarily, 
intentionally, and knowingly waive his constitutional 
right to be present at all stages of the trial. The 
record reveals that the trial court failed to provide 
notice to Mr. Belt of the communication received from 
the jury and of the proposed supplemental charge or 
response to the communication of the jury. 
B. The trial court, by failing to allow Mr. Belt to 
be present in person during the improper communication 
between the judge and jury, violated the mandatory 
language of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (a), 
which requires that in all cases the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel. In addition, the trial court's failure to 
inform Mr. Belt about the improper communication with 
the jury violated Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. By failing to enter the question 
14 
and answer into the record, the trial court violated 
Rule 17(m) and thereby failed to provide Mr. Belt the 
opportunity to object. 
2. The trial court denied Mr. Belt of his constitutional 
right to due process by its failure to enter the question and 
answer into the record. By so doing, the trial court denied Mr. 
Belt of the opportunity to object to the supplemental instruction 
or response given to the jury without notice to Mr. Belt. 
3. By failing to object to Mr. Belt's absence during the 
in-chambers hearing concerning the proposed communication between 
the judge and the jury, appointed trial counsel deprived Mr. Belt 
of his constitutional right to be present in person at all stages 
of the trial as well as his rights to due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE ACCUSED HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
PRESENT IN PERSON TO DEFEND AT ALL STAGES OF THE 
TRIAL• 
Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel . . . . "4 
4Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also provides 
that u[i]n all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel." 
15 
(Emphasis added); see also State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58 n.l (Utah 
1978); State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 513, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah 1935) .5 Because this is an important right with both state 
and federal constitutional underpinnings,6 see Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970) ("One of the most 
basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the 
accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of 
his [or her] trial."), private communications with the jury 
"create a presumption of prejudice." United States v. Treatman, 
524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975). 
5The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 
P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935), stated: 
There is no doubt but that the constitutional right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a sacred 
right of one accused of crime which may not be 
infringed or frittered away, and is one which may not 
be denied by a court or be waived by counsel. 
Id. at 513, 51 P.2d at 1055. 
6The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
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The trial court, in the instant case, denied Mr. Belt of his 
state constitutional right to appear and defend in person at all , 
stages of the trial by denying him the opportunity to be present 
at the informal hearing in chambers when the judge dictated and 
discussed with counsel the proposed response to the jury's note. 
Lee, 585 P.2d at 58 n.l. In the course of precluding Mr. Belt 
from being present in person during the communication between the 
i 
judge and jury, the trial court did not inform Mr. Belt of the 
substance of the proposed communication and thereby failed to 
afford him the opportunity to be heard before the supplemental < 
charge or response was given to the jury. No justification 
exists for the trial court's denial of Mr. Belt's constitutional 
I 
right. 
The trial court committed plain error by failing to allow 
Mr. Belt's to be present at all stages of the trial. See State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined the following principles involved in determining whether < 
xvplain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief ( 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (I) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
 { 
17 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 
(Utah 1989), in most circumstances, the term "manifest injustice" 
found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) is synonymous with the "plain 
error" standard expressly set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 
103(d). 
Based on the plain and well-settled language of article I, 
section 12, of the Utah Constitution, Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17 (a), and supporting case law, as discussed herein, 
the trial court committed obvious error by failing to allow Mr. 
Belt to be present in person during the in-chambers discussion 
and decision concerning the communication between the judge and 
jury. In light of the quantum of evidence presented at trial 
(See Statement of Facts Nos. 3-6 set forth above), the jury 
apparently questioned the culpability of Mr. Belt. This is 
further evinced by the substance of the note delivered to the 
judge, which indicates an apparent lack of desire on behalf of 
the jury to convict Mr. Belt as charged. Thus, Mr. Belt was 
prejudiced. 
18 
A. Any waiver of the constitutional right to be 
present at all stages of the trial must 
necessarily be voluntary, intentional, and 
knowing. 
In State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "[a]ny waiver of the right to be 
present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.'" Id. at 1110 (quoting State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). "To 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant 
must have notice of the proceedings." Id. (citing United States 
v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Moreover, a 
defendant's "absence must be voluntary in the sense that he is 
free to attend, not incarcerated elsewhere." Id. (citing State 
v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986)). 
In the case at bar, the record reveals that the trial court 
failed to provide notice to Mr. Belt of the in-chambers hearing 
concerning the communication received from the jury and of the 
discussion of and decision to supplementally charge or respond to 
the communication of the jury. By so doing, the trial court 
denied Mr. Belt of the constitutionally mandated right to be 
present in person at all stages of the trial. Inasmuch as Mr. 
Belt was unaware of the communication between the judge and jury, 
he did not voluntarily or intentionally waive the right. 
19 
B. The right to be present at all stages of the 
trial is further required by Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 17(a) and by Utah case 
law. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (a) , consistent with 
article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution, requires that 
"[i]n all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel." (Emphasis added). This right 
is also set forth in Utah Supreme Court case law. See State v. 
Lee, 585 P.2d 58 n.3 (Utah 1978); State v. Myers, 28 Utah 2d 254, 
255-56, 508 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1973) . 
Where the language of a rule is plain and unambiguous, the 
appellate court will not look beyond the language to determine 
its intent. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 
(Utah 1989); Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 
1035 (Utah 1983) (stating terms of statute should be given an 
interpretation and application which is in accord with their 
usually accepted meanings'' in holding term "shall" mandatory) . 
The term "shall" "is usually presumed mandatory and has been 
interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." 
Board of Educ, 659 P.2d at 1035; see also Herr v. Salt Lake 
County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974) ("The meaning of the word 
shall is ordinarily that of command."); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 1085 (1986) (defining "shall" as "used 
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in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is 
mandatory"). Because the language of Rule 17(a) is mandatory, , 
the trial court had no discretion to preclude Mr. Belt from being 
present in person during the discussion of and decision 
concerning the communication between the judge and jury. 
The trial court's failure to inform Mr. Belt about the 
improper communication with the jury violated Rule 17(m) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 
3-4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also Rogers v. United States, 422 
U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094 (1975) (stating that it was ( 
clear that a message from a jury should be answered in open court 
after counsel has been informed of its substance and has been 
i 
given an opportunity to be heard) (citing Shields v. United 
States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-89, 47 S.Ct. 478, 479 (1927)); United 
States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The 
procedure is well-established. When a communication is received 
from the jury, counsel should be informed of its substance and 
afforded an opportunity to be heard before a supplemental charge { 
is given."). The manner in which the trial court responded to 
the jury's note required it to "enter the question and answer 
i 
into the record, giving not only" counsel but Mr. Belt "the 
opportunity to object to the instruction." Lucero, 866 P.2d at 
4. By failing to enter the question and answer into the record,
 { 
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the trial court violated Rule 17(m) and thereby failed to provide 
Mr. Belt the opportunity to object. Id.; cf. State v. Anderson, 
929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996); Utah Constitution, article I, 
section 12. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ENTER THE QUESTION 
AND RESPONSE TO THE JURY'S QUESTION DENIED MR. 
BELT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS. 
Not only did the trial court's improper communication with 
the jury deny Mr. Belt of his constitutional right to be present 
in person at all stages of the trial, the trial court's failure 
also denied Mr. Belt of his constitutional right to due process.7 
See Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Rawlings, 892 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). uxTimely and 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
way are the very heart of procedural fairness.'" Rawlings, 893 
P.2d at 1069 (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted)). UX[A]11 parties are entitled 
to notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court 
and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on that 
issue before decision.'" Id. (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734, 743 (Utah 1990)). "The failure to give adequate notice and 
7The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no person in a criminal case shall "be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." 
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opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due process 
under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution."8 Plumb, 
809 P.2d at 743. 
III. BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO MR. BELT'S ABSENCE DURING 
THE IN-CHAMBERS HEARING CONCERNING THE PROPOSED 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE JUDGE AND THE JURY# 
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED MR. BELT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IN PERSON AT 
ALL STAGES OF THE TRIAL AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984) , the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 1064. Utah courts subsequently adopted this test, which 
follows: "To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. 
8Article I, section 7, of the Utah State Constitution 
provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
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Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State v. Wright, 
893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 
364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant 
must nxidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the 
circumstances, xshow that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 
2064 (footnotes omitted); see also Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 
(quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)). A defendant must 
"overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
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at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at , 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522; Frame, 723 P.2d 
at 405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the 
appellate court "should consider the totality of the evidence, 
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the 
• entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
< 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 
P.2d at 187; see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah 
1996) . i 
As discussed in detail above, in light of the plain and 
well-settled language of article I, section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) and (m), and 
supporting case law, appointed trial counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to 
object to Mr. Belt's absence during the in-chambers discussion 
and decision concerning the communication between the judge and 
jury. Appointed trial counsel's failure to object denied Mr. < 
Belt of his constitutional right to be present in person at all 
stages of the trial, as well as his constitutional rights to due 
i 
process and the effective assistance of counsel. By failing to 
so object, appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Belt from that to 
which he was entitled, namely, the opportunity to be present in
 ( 
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person to defend or object concerning the communication with the 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Lynn L. Belt, as Defendant in the 
instant case, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction of Assault by a Prisoner and for such other relief as 
the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances in 
this case. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Mr. Belt requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel issues 
in the instant appeal dealing with, among other things, the 
constitutional right of an accused to be present in person at all 
stages of the trial. These issues present matters requiring 
further development in the area of criminal law for the benefit 
of both the bar and public. Counsel for Mr. Belt further 
requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be 
26 
by opinion designated "For Official Publication" for purposes of 
precedential value and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of January, 2000. 
OLIT^ WIGGINS, P . C . 
-'Wiggins 
Attorney£**£or Appellant 
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August 27, 1999 
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 
The matter before the Court today is the State of Utah 
against Lynn L. Belt. Let me indicate there are two 
numbers that I want to make a part of the record in this 
case. The case is now on appeal and when it was in the 
Court below, the trial court, my court, it was Case No. 
971701637. This same case is before the Court of Appeals 
with the Court of Appeals No. 981688. And I understand the 
status of the case is that a motion was filed by the State 
in the Court of Appeals asking that the matter be, that the 
record of the matter be supplemented and according to the 
Minute Entry from the Court of Appeals, that motion was 
granted by stipulation from the defendant and the matter 
was thereupon remanded back to the Court to supplement the 
record on appeal, specifically the issue, according to the 
Minute Entry, is for the Court to prepare findings of fact 
concerning the nature and content of the trial court's 
discussions with counsel and the jury with respect to the 
jury note which was given by the jury during the period of 
deliberation. 
With that explanation and for the record, let me 
have counsel make an appearance and at the same time let me 
1 
1 also indicate that defendant Lynn Belt is present here in 
2 this hearing. 
3 So, Mr. Cole, will you proceed? 
4 MR. COLE: David Cole from the Davis County 
5 Attorney's Office for the State. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 MR. WIGGINS: Scott L. Wiggins on behalf of Mr. 
8 Belt, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wiggins. And I 
10 understand, gentlemen, that there is a written stipulation 
11 in this matter, is that correct? 
12 MR. WIGGINS: Kind of. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. COLE: If I might advise the Court. 
15 MR. WIGGINS: If I might, as well. Your Honor, 
16 just as a bit of correction and I might be nitpicking here 
17 but we did not stipulate to the motion to supplement the 
18 record. We did not oppose it on certain grounds but it was 
19 not stipulated. We did file a response to that. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. The Minute Entry will be that 
21 Belt has no objection to the motions being granted and that 
22 is different than a stipulation. So, I appreciate that, 
23 Mr. Wiggins. 
24 MR. WIGGINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
25 MR. COLE: Your Honor, there are two issues for 
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the Court and I should probably provide the Court some 
background quickly and, counsel, feel free to jump in if 
you need to, 
I discussed what occurred with respect to the 
note that was sent to the Court during jury deliberations 
with both defense counsel at trial and the prosecutor at 
trial. The prosecutor was Mel Wilson, defense counsel was 
Laura Thompson. I've discussed with them extensively what 
their recollection is of what occurred. 
Counsel and I have talked this morning about I 
drafted a stipulation based on what information I had as of 
yesterday. We've made a few adjustments to that 
stipulation this morning. There is one additional question 
that we have for the Court. We would probably simply ask 
the Court to make a record of the Court's recollection on 
that issue. Other than that, we have a very straight 
forward stipulation. We can simply provide an oral 
statement of what that is and I'll provide my notes to the 
Court if you want or we can provide the written findings of 
fact in accordance with the stipulation, however the Court 
wants to do that. 
THE COURT: If it's agreeable with counsel, I 
think I'd like to have you give me the verbal stipulation 
but I'd like it followed up with a written stipulation 
signed by both counsel. 
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1 MR. COLE: And it's drafted to the point where I 
2 can simply go to the office and counsel and I can sit down 
3 and sign it and give it to the Court before we leave today. 
4 THE COURT: And I take it that your discussion 
5 with Mr. Wilson and with Ms. Thompson in terms of what 
6 happened, Mr Wiggins has been a part of that and is fully 
7 aware of what they would testify to if they were called as 
8 witnesses. 
9 MR. COLE: My understanding is that Mr. Wiggins 
10 has talked with Laura Thompson previous to this. Is that 
11 accurate? 
12 MR. WIGGINS: Yes, yes. I've talked to her on 
13 the phone a couple of times about it, your Honor. However, 
14 I'm a little bit in the dark about what the testimony would 
15 actually be to be quite honest with you. Mr. Verhoef 
16 initially, when he called me prior to filing his motion to 
17 supplement the record, indicated some representations that 
18 were going to be made by Mr. Wilson concerning an 
19 in-chambers conference that was not part of his motion and 
20 for whatever reason—I was hoping he was going to be here 
21 today—but for whatever reason he pulled that from his 
22 affidavit that he drafted for Mr. Wilson, so I was somewhat 
23 puzzled by that. We can probably clear that up by way of a 
24 factual scenario consequentially or sequentially leading up 
25 to that but I don't think I can agree as far as knowing 
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1 that that's what they're going to testify to. 
2 MR. COLE: Let me clarify, your Honor. What 
3 happened, what is at issue is whether, essentially whether 
4 or not counsel was present and had input into the Court's 
5 decision to send a response back to the jury. There is no 
6 question according to Mr. Wilson or to Ms. Thompson that 
7 the Court made contact. And I'll tell you what our 
8 stipulation is and I think it will become clear to the 
9 Court why I don't think it's an issue. Mr. Wilson and Ms. 
10 Thompson are both here today. If there is any question, 
11 they're here in the building. We can get them and get any 
12 clarification that counsel needs. 
13 What we proposed to stipulate to is the 
14 following: During jury deliberations in the matter of State 
15 v. Lynn Belt, the fore person sent a note to Judge Hansen 
16 desiring to know "what was Mr. Belt in jail for". The note 
17 was given to the bailiff and I believe it was Deputy Brown. 
18 Is that accurate? 
19 THE COURT: Deputy Kevin Brown. He was the 
20 bailiff. 
21 MR. COLE: Who took it immediately to Judge 
22 Hansen. Deputy Brown did not discuss the note or the case 
23 with jury members. Judge Hansen convened an informal 
24 hearing in chambers and asked the parties to be present. 
25 Melvin Wilson was present in person representing the State. 
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1 Laura Thompson was present via telephone representing the 
2 defendant who was not present. And I believe also present 
3 was Glenda Pitman, Judge Hansen's clerk. Is that accurate? 
4 THE COURT: Not a Glenda Pitman. It's Laura Ann 
5 Attanisco, A-T-T-A-N-I-S-C-O. 
6 MR. COLE: Would you spell that one more time? 
7 THE COURT: A-T-T-A-N-I-S-C-O, I believe. 
8 THE CLERK: C-I-O. A-S-C-I-O. 
9 MR. COLE: A-S-C-I-O. 
10 THE COURT: And not as part of this stipulation 
11 but for the benefit of both counsel, this case was tried in 
12 Layton. Laura Ann Attinascio was my lead clerk in Layton 
13 and was part of the trial. 
14 MR. COLE: Okay. Anyway, she was also present. 
15 The proceedings were not recorded. Judge Hansen drafted 
16 the response to the jury that read "The reason Mr. Belt was 
17 in jail is irrelevant. Please proceed with your 
18 deliberations based on the testimony presented in the 
19 courtroom. Darwin C. Hansen, District Court Judge." 
20 Counsel for both the State and the defendant agreed 
21 that the language in the response were appropriate and note 
22 that Judge Hansen's response were returned to the jury by 
23 Deputy Brown who did not discuss the note or it's contents 
24 with jury members. 
25 The only other additional question and 
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supplementation of the record that I think counsel and I 
feel would be appropriate is for the Court to indicate if 
there was a particular reason that the proceedings were not 
recorded or if that was simply an oversight on everyone's 
part or if it was standard practice of the Court. Just a 
clarification as to the reasoning why it was not recorded 
and I was not there and I don't know. It's been my 
experience that in many courts they are not recorded. It's 
been counsel's experience that they are recorded in all 
courts and so we don't know what the answer to that is and 
Ms. Thompson and Mr. Wilson could not clarify that. So 
we've asked for that clarification from the Court. 
But other than that the facts seem to be very 
straight forward and we believe, after talking with Ms. 
Thompson, Mr. Wilson, and counsel that this probably covers 
everything that we need from the perspective of the Court 
of Appeals. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wiggins? 
MR. WIGGINS: Your Honor, I believe that's 
accurate and I don't want to appear in anyway to be 
disrespectful to the Court. 
THE COURT: You won't be. 
MR. WIGGINS: We're merely trying to do as the 
Court of Appeals has asked us to do. I would have one 
follow-up inquiry and that would be as to why the defendant 
7 
1 wasn't present as well. 
2 THE COURT: All right. 
3 MR. WIGGINS: Asked to be present during that 
4 communication. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Both questions are fair 
6 questions and let me even go one step further. My 
7 recollection of the course of events is as set forth in the 
8 stipulation. The reason that the defendant was not 
9 present, it was my judgment. And the defendant was in the 
10 holding cell at the time because the jury was in 
11 deliberation. Ms. Thompson had left the courthouse but 
12 left a telephone number where she could be reached. I did 
13 not reconvene court in the courtroom on this matter because 
14 I thought it inappropriate to have the defendant come in 
15 without counsel being present and, therefore, did not do 
16 that. 
17 We got Laura Thompson on the telephone. Wilson 
18 was on the telephone. We discussed as the stipulation 
19 outlined the question and the appropriate response. The 
20 appropriate response was agreed upon. It was written on 
21 the paper not by me but by Laura Attinascio as I dictated 
22 to her. I then signed the document and wrote underneath my 
23 name District Court Judge. Then I gave the note to the 
24 bailiff and he returned it to the jury. 
25 Why it wasn't recorded is a judgment of the 
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Court. The telephone was such that it could have been 
recorded magnetically on magnetic tape. That was the only 
recording we had in Layton. My conclusion was that the 
note in terms of the question and in terms of the response 
spoke for itself and the note indicated that the jury, the 
question and the answer were such that it seemed to be 
implicit that the jury was not called into the jury room 
and, therefore, we simply had a conversation and gave it 
back to the bailiff so the jury could continue 
deliberations without undue delay waiting for Laura 
Thompson to come back to the Court. That's probably a 
misjudgment on the Court's part and hereafter I'll record 
them. It's that simple. 
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. COLE: I think that takes care of all the 
questions we have. 
MR. WIGGINS: One more follow up (inaudible). 
Was just to clarify. Again, I'm a little bit foggy on 
this. So, Mr. Wilson was on the telephone as well from his 
office. It was a conference call? 
THE COURT: No, no. Mr. Wilson was in my 
chambers. I'm on the telephone and the telephone is on the 
speaker. 
MR. WIGGINS: Okay. 
THE COURT: So Mr. Wilson can hear. 
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And 
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me 
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and Mr. 
Wilson and we have the conversation via telephone with Mr. 
Wilson and myself in chambers on the speaker phone and 
Laura Thompson, wherever she was, we had the telephone 
number. I don't know if that was her office or somewhere 
else. 
MR. COLE: I believe it was actually her cell 
phone. 
MR. WIGGINS: I think she was at a cell phone and 
she was at a burger, I don't know if that's relevant. 
MR. COLE: She was on her way to get something to 
eat is what I had heard. And I don't know the details but 
she was on a cell phone. 
THE COURT: And the reason we went ahead and the 
reason I did not want to delay and wait until she returned 
is because I wanted to get the answer back to the jury so 
the jury could continue deliberation. I thought that was 
an expedient way to do it and that the note would speak for 
itself and in retrospect, clearly that telephone conference 
should have been recorded. No doubt about it. 
MR. WIGGINS: Were there any discussions by 
counsel and the Court about supplemental instructions as a 
follow-up to the response, your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: There were not. It was my judgment 
2 that the instructions were sufficient. It was my judgment 
3 that the issue as to why Mr. Belt was in jail was 
4 irrelevant and to belabor that point with specifics with a 
5 jury in my judgment I think would have, well, it would have 
6 had no probative value and it very well may have been 
7 significantly prejudicial to the defendant. And under Rule 
8 403 I didn't think there was any reason at all for that to 
9 come in. And so I simply instructed Ms. Attinascio to 
10 write the response which was agreed upon by both counsel. 
11 Then I signed it and we gave it to the bailiff and the 
12 bailiff returned it to the jury. And that's it. 
13 MR. COLE: Would the Court like me to redo the 
14 stipulation as indicated? I'm not sure how much of what 
15 the Court has provided I should put in the stipulation. 
16 What I thought we'd do is stipulate to these facts and 
17 allow the Court to supplement this with the indications 
18 you've had in response to the two follow-up question 
19 counsel made. Then we, I don't know if you want me to 
20 provide findings of fact, if you want counsel to do it, if 
21 you want to do them yourself. You tell us how you want to 
22 handle that procedurally. I think that everyone should 
23 look at them before they're signed as to form at least. 
24 But other than that I'm at the Court's pleasure. 
25 MR. WIGGINS: Did you have in there? I can't 
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1 remember we talked back in the back but did you have in 
2 there that Ms. Thompson couldn't recall -
3 MR. COLE: No, I did not. 
4 MR. WIGGINS: — her recollection. 
5 MR. COLE: Ms. Thompson's indication was she 
6 recalls the telephone conversation with the Court. She 
7 recalls that she agreed that that was an appropriate 
8 response when it was read to her. She doesn't recall 
9 knowing that Mr. Wilson was there. I got the impression in 
10 talking with her that she thought, her recollection now is 
11 that she was talking just with the Court. She doesn't 
12 remember having heard Mr. Wilson on the speaker phone. 
13 Fair enough? 
14 THE COURT: I don't know if it helps but there is 
15 no doubt that Mr. Wilson was on the phone and I wouldn't 
16 call and talk with plaintiff's counsel, I wouldn't call and 
17 talk with the defense counsel by herself without the 
18 prosecution being on the telephone, nor would I do it in 
19 the reverse order. 
20 MR. WIGGINS: Yeah, and I don't think there is 
21 any question that did not occur. She just doesn't remember 
22 hearing Mr. Wilson's voice. And that may have be because 
23 she was in a burger joint, you know. Who knows. So -
24 THE COURT: I'm glad you're here to defend 
25 yourself, Ms. Thompson. The record may reflect that Ms. 
12 
Laura Thompson just came in the courtroom. 
MR. COLE: What I think we'll do if the Court 
pleasure is okay with this is that we'll walk to my office 
and fix the stipulation and sign it. Counsel and I will 
make sure that it's accurate to counsel's recollection. 
Then we'll ask that the Court supplement that in making 
findings. Do you want me to draft findings and then the 
Court can amend them? How would you like to (inaudible). 
MR. WIGGINS: If I just might make a suggestion 
and maybe the Court obviously will do what it wants with it 
but maybe what we do, is this is going to need to be 
transcribed anyway for purposes of going back up on appeal. 
Maybe if we transcribe it as quickly as possible then why 
don't we draft the findings of fact from that? 
MR. COLE: That would work. 
MR. WIGGINS: And if we can do it in a 
stipulation form with both counsel signing off on it as the 
Court would desire and then — 
THE COURT: And then myself signing it confirming 
the findings. 
MR. WIGGINS: Right. 
THE COURT: Would that make sense? 
MR. WIGGINS: Right. 
THE COURT: And then include in the findings all 
of the necessary information that both counsel believe is 
13 
1 appropriate in light of the nature of this appeal based 
2 upon the transcript of this hearing and based upon the 
3 stipulation of the specific facts that occurred that you 
4 just mentioned. 
5 MR. COLE: Yes. And I think actually if counsel, 
6 that's a great idea, Scott. If counsel and I do it 
7 together then there won't be any question that we've 
8 included both the stipulation we've indicated today and the 
9 Court's responses to the questions. 
10 MR. WIGGINS: Let's do it that way, counsel. 
11 That's good. 
12 THE COURT: And then put a confirmation statement 
13 for the Court's signature at the end of those findings. 
14 We'll make them part of the file and then I'll instruct the 
15 clerk to transmit this file. Well, I will simply give this 
16 file to the clerk here in our office and then she can 
17 follow the appropriate procedure and send it back to the 
18 Court of Appeals and I'm sure that that transcript will, 
19 you will want it to be a part of this file. 
20 MR. WIGGINS: Correct. 
21 THE COURT: Together with the findings that you 
22 gentlemen are going to prepare. 
23 MR. COLE: The last thing that we'd ask the Court 
24 to do is order that the tape be transcribed. Typically we 
25 have to receive an order from the Court. If you'd just do 
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that orally now we can probably get that process moved 
along quickly. I know counsel has, would like to see that 
done quickly and so would I for that matter. 
THE COURT: So ordered. And if you need a 
written order, prepare one and I will sign it. 
MR. COLE: We'll do that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else, gentlemen? 
MR. COLE: I don't believe so. 
MR. WIGGINS: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I want to say, 
make one other comment. 
Mr. Wiggins, I appreciate you being here. 
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And I'm glad that you're a part of it 
and your comment about the Court, don't worry about that at 
all. A full and complete record needs to be made with the 
Court of Appeals for their review. This ought to have been 
recorded. It wasn't and all us learn from our 
indiscretions in the past and I can assure you it won't 
happen again. 
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you, your Honor. Appreciate 
it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. COLE: Thank you, Judge, we'll do that as 
quickly as we can. 
15 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During the first stages of the July 17, 1998, jury 
deliberations in the matter of State v. Belt, the foreperson sent 
a note to the Court desiring to know "What was Mr. Belt in jail 
fore (sic)". 
2. The note was given to bailiff Kevin Brown, who took 
it immediately to the Court. 
3. Deputy Brown did not discuss the note or the case 
with jury members. 
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4. The Court convened an informal hearing in chambers 
with Melvin C. Wilson, in person, as counsel for the State, Laura 
K. Thompson, via cellular telephone, as counsel for Defendant, 
and Lara-Anne Attaniscio, Judge Hansen's law clerk. 
5. The Defendant was not present during the informal 
hearing in chambers even though he was in a holding cell at the 
time. 
6. The informal hearing in chambers was not recorded 
even though it could have been recorded by magnetic tape. 
7. During the informal hearing in chambers, the Court 
used the speaker phone so that all in chambers could hear each 
others' comments. 
8. Ms. Thompson recalls speaking with the court via 
telephone and agreeing that the Court's proposed response was 
appropriate, but does not recall knowing that Mr. Wilson was 
present in the Court's chambers. 
9. The Court dictated and proposed a response to the 
jury that read, "The reason Mr. Belt was in jail is irrelevant. 
Please proceed with your deliberations based on the testimony 
presented in the courtroom." The Court signed the note, "Darwin 
C. Hansen, District Court Judge." 
10. Counsel for both the state and the Defendant, who 
was not present, agreed that the language and response were 
appropriate. 
11. The note and the Court's response were returned to 
the jury by Deputy Brown, who did not discuss the note or its 
contents with jury members. 
12. No supplemental jury instructions were given. It 
was the Court's judgement that an instruction would unduly 
belabor an irrelevant point, to the Defendant's detriment. 
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